To the surprise of the Hungarian media and public, Origo reported on July 14 that António Costa, Portugal’s socialist prime minister since 2015, had paid a short visit to Budapest. Viktor Orbán’s personal spokesman described the purpose of the visit as a “preparatory discussion ahead of the European summit” that is taking place at the moment in Brussels. That’s all we heard about the visit from Hungary.
We got information about the meeting from Costa after his return from the Hungarian capital. He gave an interview to the Portuguese public television station, where he was questioned about his visit to Budapest and about the details of the threat of a Hungarian veto in the event that European politicians insist on coupling financial assistance and the rule of law in their discussions of the next seven-year budget (€1.074 trillion) and a €750 recovery fund. The Portuguese prime minister asserted that he will not support the coupling scheme devised by German, Dutch, and other politicians because, in his opinion, “one cannot purchase values.”
António Costa and Viktor Orbán in the private garden of the prime minister’s office
A day later, he made himself even clearer in an opinion piece in Portugal’s leading newspaper, Público. It was an answer to another opinion piece written by Rui Tavares, the former member of the European Parliament who was responsible for the first critical report on Viktor Orbán’s trampling on democracy in Hungary. In 2013, members of the European People’s Party managed to kill the Tavares Report, and eventually it fell to Judith Sargentini to pen the second report on Hungary in 2018. Tavares in his article complained about his prime minister’s willingness to enter into a discussion with Viktor Orbán. What he should have done, Tavares insisted, was to tell him that if he insists on the veto then the intended sum should be divided among countries that belong to the eurozone. Costa retorted that “the problem with this brilliant idea is that it does not prevent the Hungarian veto and in fact only manages to guarantee the veto of the other excluded countries.” A veto by Hungary would be followed by other like-minded countries which, in his opinion, “would only prolong the impasse in the negotiations, which would be irresponsible.” Thus, by July 15 Orbán had secured the support of Portugal.
Hungarian opinion pieces about the summit and Viktor Orbán’s chances of blackmailing the European Union came down, on balance, in favor of Orbán. On July 15, Péter Magyari of 444 remained optimistic about Germany’s position, which allegedly still insists on coupling financial assistance and the rule of law. Moreover, the German minister responsible for European affairs contended that Germany hopes to have a serious discussion of the Sargentini Report and Article 7, which others have already buried. A day later, a long interview was published in Magyar Narancs with Dániel Hegedűs, an analyst with the German Marshall Fund, who argued that the German public don’t find questions of human rights and the rule of law as important as the effects of COVID-19 and climate change. It is true that the Netherlands is a champion of the cause of transparency and the rule of law, but it is unlikely that Prime Minister Mark Rutte will be able to obtain the support of others. In the course of the interview, Hegedűs outlined the major successful gambits of Orbán over the last ten years in Brussels and concluded that the Hungarian opposition should give up hope of help coming from Brussels. As he said, “Orbán can accomplish almost everything in the European Union.”
Ágnes Szűcs of Index, a regular contributor to the internet site’s “Eurologus,” is equally pessimistic about the European Union’s determination to stop Viktor Orbán for the simple reason that the Union doesn’t have the necessary mechanism for “disciplining rogue leaders.” Not only does Orbán have the support of António Costa, but even Mark Rutte spoke in the Dutch parliament about abandoning the idea of the “reverse qualified majority veto” (RQMV) proposed by the Commission in the context of the economic governance package, which, if introduced, would give leverage to those who would like to see sanctions against countries like Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, and Hungary.
What is the RQMV? If the European Commission proposes sanctions against a state, in a normal qualified majority veto, at least 15 countries of the 27 member states with a population of at least 65% of the total population of the European Union would have to accept the sanctions against a rogue state. In a reverse qualified majority veto, the minimum required to reject the Commission’s proposal is again 15 countries with a combined population of at least 65% of the EU’s total population. In the former case, sanctions can be blocked relatively easily by a minority coalition. In the latter case, sanctions would take effect by default unless a qualified majority overrules them. As Portfolio explained, “This means that the mere passive stance of bigger member states would be sufficient for sanctions to take effect, requiring no active judgment on the rule of law in other member states. As a result, the reversed qualified majority could pose much bigger dangers to Hungary and Poland.”
In light of these developments, Ágnes Szűcs is convinced that “Orbán can start off on his journey to the Brussels summit on Friday knowing that he won that battle already on Tuesday.”
In connection with the RQMV issue, there is an opinion piece in Balkan Insights that is worth consulting. The author is Dániel Bartha, director of the think tank Center for Euro-Atlantic Integration and Democracy located in Budapest. His claim is that Orbán was initially not averse to some watered-down demands on democratic governance and was ready for a compromise. In the last few years, when he was forced to retreat, he always got away with only minor “adjustments” to the constitution or administrative practices, but no substantial change was necessary to alter the situation on the ground. According to Bartha, it was the decision to introduce the reverse qualified majority veto which changed his mind and prompted him to use blackmail and threaten the EU with a veto of his own. In Bartha’s opinion, the hardening of Orbán’s position came as a result of Berlin’s support for the introduction of RQMV because, “under this scenario, Poland and Hungary would be under pressure to assemble a majority to block the introduction of rule of law conditionality. The Hungarian PM recognized early on that this would be impossible, and so launched a counter-offensive.”
If Mark Rutte is ready to abandon RQMV, then Ágnes Szűcs is right. Orbán has already won. In any case, he is optimistic. He thinks the odds are in his favor. He certainly has a good track record.